Oxford Studies in Normative Ethicsis an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well.OSNEwill be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Introduction,Mark Timmons 1. The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs,Holly M. Smith 2. Kantian Constructivism as Normative Ethics,Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 3. Treating Consenting Adults Merely as Means,Samuel J. Kerstein 4. Two Levels of Moral Thinking,Daniel Star 5. In Defense of Consequentializing,Jamie Dreier 6. Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism,Douglas W. Portmore 7. Cordelia's Bond and Indirect Consequentialism,Nick Zangwill 8. You Don't Have to do What's Best! A Problem for Consequentialists and Other Teleologists,S. Andrew Schroeder 9. Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common Sense Morality,Paul McNamara 10. The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited,Ulrike Heuer 11. Normative Ethics and Pictures as Tools of Moral Persuasion,Sarah McGrath 12. Two Cheers for Virtue, or, Might Virtue be Habit Forming?,Peter Railton
Mark Timmonsis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is the author ofMorality Without Foundations, and editor ofKant's Metaphysics of Morals.