Logicians have written a great deal on the semantics of conditional sentences. This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists. Syntactic data are used to make the case that If -clauses tacitly quantify over items called events, circumstances, or conditions. This motivates a semantic theory of conditionals that concentrates on only if, even if and unless as well as on If...then. The theory is then applied to a number of examples from the literature, and its predictions and successes compare favorably to those of competing semantic theories.
Preface, Acknowledgements
1. The Syntax of Conditional Sentences
2. Truth Conditions: The Event Theory
3. Truth Conditions: Reality and Modus Ponens
4. In Defense of Truth-Value
5. A Beautiful But False Theory of 'Even If'
6. An Unbeautiful But Less Easily Refuatable Theory of 'Even If'
7. The 'Indicative'/'Subjunctive' Distinction
8. The Riverboat Puzzle
Appendix: 'Nonconditional Conditionals' (with Michael L. Geis)
Revisionary Postscript on Nonconditional Conditionals
Bibliography, Index
After reading [Lycan's] work, it's hard to take seriously work that does not share [his] methodology. ...
Real Conditionalsis a great contribution to the literature, and if it causes more theorists to pay serious attention to Lycan's Event Theory, that would be an excellent consequence. --
ThePhilosophical ReviewWilliam Lycan is William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina.