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Securities against Misrule Juries, Assemblies, Elections [Hardcover]

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  • Category: Books (Political Science)
  • Author:  Elster, Jon
  • Author:  Elster, Jon
  • ISBN-10:  1107031737
  • ISBN-10:  1107031737
  • ISBN-13:  9781107031739
  • ISBN-13:  9781107031739
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  338
  • Pages:  338
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2013
  • Pub Date:  01-May-2013
  • SKU:  1107031737-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  1107031737-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 100880619
  • Seller: ShopSpell
  • Ships in: 2 business days
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  • Delivery by: Jul 05 to Jul 07
  • Notes: Brand New Book. Order Now.
This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy.It is often argued that democratic institutions should be designed to produce good outcomes, assuming that we know what good outcomes are and which institutions will track them. This book denies both assumptions. The idea of the general interest is ill-defined and our understanding of social causality is fragile. Instead, one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. In addition to making novel theoretical proposals, this book discusses a welter of case studies and historical episodes.It is often argued that democratic institutions should be designed to produce good outcomes, assuming that we know what good outcomes are and which institutions will track them. This book denies both assumptions. The idea of the general interest is ill-defined and our understanding of social causality is fragile. Instead, one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. In addition to making novel theoretical proposals, this book discusses a welter of case studies and historical episodes.This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chals+
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