The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory [Paperback]

The most complete defense of causal decision theory available.This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utitlity theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a representation theorem that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. In providing the most complete and robust defense of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers in philosophy, economics, psychology, mathematics, and artificial intelligence.This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utitlity theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a representation theorem that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. In providing the most complete and robust defense of causal decision theory the book will be of interest to a broad range of readers in philosophy, economics, psychology, mathematics, and artificial intelligence.This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the nonspecialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a representation theorem that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision thel3/