Agents or Bosses [Paperback]

Focusing on intra-party competition, this book presents an original explanation of why some politicians and parties engage more extensively in such practices than others.Clientelism in public employment  the practice of offering jobs in return for political favours to a party or politician  is a problem from the perspectives of equality, democratic accountability and economic efficiency. Focusing on intra-party competition, this book presents an original explanation of why some politicians and parties engage more extensively in such practices than others. Examining Argentina and Turkey in a period of economic restructuring, the author argues that patronage jobs are distributed hierarchically to the politicians' circle. Consequently, the distribution of patronage is affected by competition for party leadership. Analysis of original statistical and case study data at the sub-national level confirms that clientelistic practices are influenced by party characteristics. Kemahliolu's research reveals a surprising and counterintuitive conclusion; that when party support is crucial to politicians' career progression and the leadership of the party is openly contested, the proliferation of clientelism is contained and controlled.List of Figures and Tables viiList of Abbreviations ixAcknowledgements xiChapter One: Introduction 1Chapter Two: Public Employment Reshaped: The Impact of Neo-liberal Reforms onParticularistic Exchanges 13Chapter Three: Internal Politics, Organisation and Role of Patronage withinArgentinean and Turkish Parties 43Chapter Four: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Internal Party Competition andParticularistic Exchanges within Parties 55Chapter Five: Provincial and Municipal Public Employment in Argentina 67Chapter Six: Public Employment in Turkey: An Analysis of Patronage at theSub-national Level 101Chapter Seven: Conclusion 127Appendices 131Bibliography 159Index 171?zge Kemahliolu is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at SablH