John Searle's Philosophy of Language Force, Meaning and Mind [Paperback]

A volume of original essays on key aspects of Searle's philosophy of language, prefaced by John Searle himself.This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, it aims to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions that Searle's work has addressed.This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, it aims to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions that Searle's work has addressed.This is a volume of original essays on key aspects of John Searle's philosophy of language. It examines Searle's work in relation to current issues of central significance, including internalism versus externalism about mental and linguistic content, truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional conceptions of content, the relative priorities of thought and language in the explanation of intentionality, the status of the distinction between force and sense in the theory of meaning, the issue of meaning scepticism in relation to rule-following, and the proper characterization of 'what is said' in relation to the semantics/pragmatics distinction. Written by a distinguished team of contemporary philosophers, and prefaced by an illuminating essay by Searle, the volume aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle's work in philosophy of language, and to suggest innovative approaches to fundamental questions in that area.Introduction Savas L. Tsohatzidis; 1. What is language: some preliminary remarks John R. Searle; Part I. From Mind to Meaning: 2. Content, mode, and self-reference Fran?ois Recanati; 3. Searle against the world: how can experiences find their objects? Kent Bach; 4. Seeing what is there Robin Jeshion; 5. Intentionalism, descriptivism, and propelƒq