This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law--the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and common sense views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of open texture, Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Law, Language and Legal Determinacymakes an extremely important contribution to contemporary analytic jurisprudence.....The entire book is pervaded by a sophistication in the philosophy of language, and a sophistication in the bringing the philosophy of language to bear on important legal and jurisprudential questions, that is totally unmatched in the existing literature....Thinking about language seriously has been a large part of thinking about law and interpretation for some time, but Bix takes that thinking to a wholly new level. --Frederick Schauer,
Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University The book makes an original and significant contribution to the general field of philosophy of law, and specifically to analytical jurisprudence....His book is to my mind a rare accomplishment: it is extremely valuable.... --
Duncan Kennedy, Harvard Law School The best and most accessible analysis available of Hart's views on the 'open texture' of language...an excellent and penetrating analysis of Dworkin's legal theory...Each of these chapters is a sophisticated piece of work from which I have learnt a good deal. Remarkably, however, they are written in a style which is lucid and easily accessible to beginners. I have used Bix's book in my teaching quite successfully, and have founló–