This book offers the first conceptually rigorous analysis of the political and institutional underpinnings of Brazil's recent rise. Using Brazil as a case study in multiparty presidentialism, the authors argue that Brazil's success stems from the combination of a constitutionally strong president and a robust system of checks and balances.1. The Unexpected Success of Multiparty Presidential Regimes 2. Strong President, Robust Democracy 3. The Politics of Coalition Management 4. Checks and Balances, Political Competition, and Public Goods in the Brazilian States 5. Coalition Governments and Independent Regulatory Agencies in the Brazilian States 6. Keeping a Watchful Eye: Brazil's Budgetary and Audit Institutions 7. Conclusions - The Half-full and Half-empty Glass of Brazilian Democracy
'Making Brazil Work pulls together all the threads of . . . protracted debate [about governance in Brazil] and produces new and important contributions that confirm the relevance of the Brazilian case as a laboratory for the advancement of comparative politics... It shows how the success of coalitional presidentialism is grounded on the strength and effectiveness of checks and balances. The authors make a straightforward theoretical point: Checks on presidential power need to be as strong as that power for coalitional presidentialism to produce stable and effective governments; otherwise, the tools with which presidents build and maintain their coalitions could be easily employed to undermine the democratic regime by concentrating power on the presidency.' Perspectives on Politics
During the first decade or so after Brazil's return to democracy in 1985, many observers were pessimistic about the country's political institutions. The party system was too fragmented, the legislators too individualistic, the presidency a loose cannon on the ship of state. Yet Brazil's multiparty presidentialism has delivered increasingly effective government. In this book, Melo lx