Metaphilosophy and Free Will [Hardcover]

Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that various views about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy and Free Will deconstructs the free will problem and, by example, challenges philosophers in other areas to show how their philosophical argumentation can succeed.

[A] concise and startling treatment of free will. --Choice

This work has all the virtues of Double's earlier book,The Non-Reality of Free Will. It is iconoclastic in the views defended and, as a consequence, highly provocative--yet at the same time very well-argued. It should be read widely and will provoke sharp reactions from philosophers and others in different fields. --Robert Kane,University of Texas at Austin

The most innovative work on free will in the last decade. Double clearly and persuasively argues that, at root, the differing views on free will have their origins in distinct conceptions about the nature of philosophy itself. This work will energize discussion in this area. In elucidating assumptions that Compatibilists, Libertarians, and Hard Determinists hold, we discover that the relevant domain of argument revolves around questions of greater generality than previously acknowledged. With jargon-free, cogent argumentation, this work may well prove to be a watershed in the free will debate. --Mark Bernstein,University of Texas at San Antonio

For those of us who have been simultaneously fascinated and frustrated by the twists and turns and lSH