In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of thought-tokens and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both externalist accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is developed to facilitate the latter. This is an important text for those interested in current theories and debates on philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and their points of intersection.
1. Minimal Content and Intentionality 2. More on Minimal Content and Related Issues 3. Thinking Differently about Thought and Language 4. The Superiority of the New Theory to Freges 5. Kripkes Puzzle about Belief Solved 6. Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made 7. Speakers Referent 8. Speakers Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction 9. Proper Names 10. Solutions to Classic Problems 11. Securing Determinate MeaningPart I: Against Kripkenstein 12. Securing Determinate MeaningPart II: Against Quine
'Philosophical conversations tend to wear deep ruts into the intellectual landscape, and the continuations of these conversations often have a hard time finding their way out of these ruts. In the case of meaning&there are problematic assumptions to the effect (1) that there is something called meaning or content that can be attributed univocally to thought-tokens and utterances (much less sentences), and (2) that an analysis of meaning should be restricted to facts accessible from a third-person perspective&.lSŠ