Moral Skepticism [Paperback]

Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls moderate moral skepticism, which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.

Part I: Issues
1 c What Is Moral Epistemology?.
2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?
3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?
4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?
5. In Contrast with What?
6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism
Part II: Theories
7. Naturalism
8. Normativism
9. Intuitionism
10. Coherentism

Overall the book was a delight to read. It's full of interesting arguments on all sorts of topics in moral metaphysics and moral epistemology. If you're interested in...moral metaphysics and moral epistemology, it's truly a book worth reading. I highly recommend it to anyone curious about these topics. --Peter J. Graham,Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has long been a leading proponent of moral skepticism--the view roughly that there is some considerable difficulty involved in attaining justified moral belief, or moral knowledge. This volume brings together his latest thoughts on the matter and provides, in addition, a survey of different sorts of skeptical problems confronting realists and cognitivists about morality... well written and covers an impressive expanse of territory. It is to be welcomed, further, as the only major book-length treatment of the topics of moral epistemology and moral skepticism to appear in some time. --Brad Majors,ETHICS

Walter Sinnott-Armstrongr isProfessor of Philosophy, Dartmouth College