Morals from Motivesdevelops a virtue ethics inspired more by Hume and Hutcheson's moral sentimentalism than by recently-influential Aristotelianism. It argues that a reconfigured and expanded morality of caring can offer a general account of right and wrong action as well as social justice. Expanding the frontiers of ethics, it goes on to show how a motive-based pure virtue theory can also help us to understand the nature of human well-being and practical reason.
PART I: MORALITY AND JUSTICE ONE: Agent-Based Virtue Ethics 1. Virtue Ethics 2. Objections to Agent-Basing 3. Morality as Inner Strength 4. Morality as Universal Benevolence 5. Morality as Caring and Further Aspects of Agent-Basing TWO: Morality and the Practical 1. Is Agent-basing Practical? 2. The Value of Conscientousness 3. Moral Conflict THREE: The Structure of Caring 1. Caring and Love 2. Balanced Caring 3. Balanced Caring versus Aggregative Partialism 4. Self-Concern 5. Sentimentalist Deontology 6. Caring versus the Philosophers FOUR: The Justice of Caring 1. From the Personal to the Political 2. Social Justice 3. Laws and Their Applications 4. Conclusion FIVE: Universal Benevolence versus Caring 1. Universal Benevolence and Universal Love 2. The Justice of Universal Benevolence 3. Humanitarianism and Religious Belief 4. Humanitarianism and Intolerance 5. The Choice between Caring and Universal Benevolence PART II: PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND HUMAN GOOD SIX: The Virtue in Self-Interest 1. Unification in Utilitarianism 2. Elevation versus Reduction 3. Is Elevation Viable? 4. Aristotelian Elevationism 5. Platonic Elevationism 6. Conclusion SEVEN: Agent-Based Practical Reason 1. Conceptions of Practical Reason 2. Agent-Based Rationality 3. Practical Reason and Self-Interest 4. The Rational Requiements of Morality 5. Conclusion