Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change [Paperback]

This book will appeal to students and professional in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of language.In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists have not discovered that sentences about natural kinds are true rather than false. Instead, scientists have found that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers and they have refined the meanings of these terms to make the sentences true. In the process, however, they have also changed the meaning of these terms. This book will appeal to students and professionals in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of language.In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists have not discovered that sentences about natural kinds are true rather than false. Instead, scientists have found that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers and they have refined the meanings of these terms to make the sentences true. In the process, however, they have also changed the meaning of these terms. This book will appeal to students and professionals in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of language.According to the received tradition, the language used to refer to natural kinds in scientific discourse remains stable even as theories about these kinds are refined. Hence, scientists discover, rather than stipulate, that sentences like 'Whales are mammals, not fish' are true. In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists do not discover that sentences about natural kinds, like 'Whales are mammals, not fish', are true rather than false. Instead, scientists find that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers, and they refine the meanings of the relevant natural-kind terms to make sentences true. Hence, scientists change the meanings of these terms. This conclusion prompts LaPorte to examine the consequences of this change in meanl#,