Oxford Studies in Metaethicsis the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Introduction 1. Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways,Sharon Street 2. How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts,Allan Gibbard 3. Parfit's Case against Subjectivism,David Sobel 4. Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare,Chris Heathwood 5. Moral Knowledge and Experience,Sarah McGrath 6. Passing the Deontic Buck,Matt Bedke 7. The Accidental Error Theorist,Richard Joyce 8. Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism,Jonas Olson 9. A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism,Campbell Brown 10. Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency,Paul Katsafanas 11. Why be An Internalist about Reasons?,Julia Markovits 12. Instrumental Rationality,Ralph Wedgwood Index
Russ Shafer-Landauis professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author ofMoral Realism: A Defence, which received an honourable mention for the 2005 APA Book Prize, andWhatever Happened to Good and Evil?.