In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like know and like cause, even while we arrive at an opposite answer relative to quite different assumptions, but equally arbitrary assumptions, about what the key terms mean.
Current debates about contextualism in epistemology begin with
Philosophical Relativity, where Unger gives the term 'contextualism' the meaning that, in many philosophical circles, it enjoys today, and gives the position designated by the term its first serious and systematic treatment. Few are likely to accept Unger's 'relativistic' conclusion that the advantages and disadvantages of contextualism and its rival, invariantism, balance out in such a way that there simply is no fact of the matter which is the correct theory, but all who want to think seriously about the issue should confront the challenging arguments in this seminal book. --Keith DeRose,
Yale University If you didn't read this book first time, read it now. It packs a punch fit to stop a whole school of philosophy dead in its tracks, with no guarantee that it will ever move again. Those who think that a philosophical inquiry has to start with a decision about the exact meanings of the key terms need to work out their answer to this one from Peter Unger. --Edward Craig,
Cambridge University Philosophical Relativityis a seminal text in the debate on contextualism, which blames philosophical problems on the hidden dependence of meaning on context. Unger's questions are even more urgent today than when he wrote. --Timothy Williamson,
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