This book seeks to understand why almost all commentators on the Irish economy were unprepared for the scale of the recent economic crisis. It analyses the public contributions from a broad range of observers, including domestic and international agencies, academics, the newspapers and politicians. This approach gives new insights into the analytical and institutional shortfalls that inhibited observers from recognising the degree of the risk. The book demonstrates that most commentators were either impeded in what they could say, or else lacked the expertise to challenge the prevailing view. The findings have significant implications for a broad range of institutions, particularly the media and the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament).
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: An Irish Depression
1. What Happened to Ireland?
i) The Credit Boom
ii) The Property and Construction Boom
iii) Fiscal Policy
iv) Competitiveness
2. International Context and EMU
3. The Banking and Wright Reports
4. Theoretical and Ideological Explanations
5. The History of Asset Bubbles and Financial Crises
6. Behavioural Explanations
7. Political and Institutional Explanations
i) Banking and Bank Regulation
ii) Politics and Fiscal Policy
8. Prediction
Conclusion
Chapter 3: International Organisations
Introduction
1. Competitiveness
2. Property and Construction