The Politics of Authoritarian Rule [Paperback]

Milan Svolik explores two fundamental conflicts that shape the politics of dictatorships: the problems of authoritarian control and authoritarian power-sharing.What drives politics in dictatorships? In this book, Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes face two fundamental challenges. The first comes from the masses over which dictators rule; the second arises from the elites with whom they rule. Svolik identifies these as the problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing and shows that they account for key outcomes in dictatorships, including their institutions and policies, as well as the survival of leaders and regimes.What drives politics in dictatorships? In this book, Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes face two fundamental challenges. The first comes from the masses over which dictators rule; the second arises from the elites with whom they rule. Svolik identifies these as the problems of authoritarian control and power-sharing and shows that they account for key outcomes in dictatorships, including their institutions and policies, as well as the survival of leaders and regimes.What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. First, dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule  this is the problem of authoritarian control. A second, separate challenge arises from the elites with whom dictators rule  this is the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Crucially, whether and how dictators resolve these two problems is shaped by the dismal environment in which authoritarian politics takes place: in a dictatorship, no independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflict. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators, such as Saddam Hussein, establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why leadership changes elsewhere are l“^