Rationality and Epistemic Sophistication [Hardcover]

For at least the past two decades, there has been intense interest in understanding how epistemic status is related to pragmatic concerns. ?In this sophisticated study of sophistication, Griesmaier embeds this now widely discussed question in a larger set of issues about the way in which our standards of epistemic rationality vary with the sophistication of the epistemic agent. ?The volume thereby casts new light on an old issue. ?This is an unusually useful and original book.Analyzing epistemic sophistication in terms of the stringency of a persons standards, her skills in using evidence, and her wisdom in employing proper standards, this book argues for a radical conception of epistemology as being concerned with the duties that arise during the process of belief formation.What factors determine whether a persons beliefs are epistemically rational? Many traditional accounts contend that those factors lie in the beliefs themselves.?For example, a belief can fit with ones evidence, it can originate in reliable (or otherwise virtuous) processes, or it can cohere with other beliefs (some of which may be self-justifying).?In this provocative book, Franz-Peter Griesmaier presents a new picture of epistemic rationality, emphasizing the role of the agent rather than the belief.?The rationality of an agents beliefs ultimately depends on her epistemic sophistication, which is manifest in the stringency of her standards, in the skill she has in accessing and evaluating evidence, and in the wisdom she displays in choosing contextually appropriate standards. To be epistemically rational means, in this view, that one has discharged ones epistemic duties by using the contextually proper standards for finding and evaluating the available evidence during the process of belief formation.In the course of defending this view, Griesmaier discusses a wide variety of topics from the perspective of a unifying framework. These topics include the possibility of lucky justification, thl£#