Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency [Paperback]

A collection of new essays on the interplay between intentions and practical reasons in law and practical agency.Exploring how and why we act when we follow practical standards, this collection of new essays focuses on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons in practical agency, making it of interest to scholars and students of philosophy of action, legal philosophy, cognitive psychology, law, social science, and ethics.Exploring how and why we act when we follow practical standards, this collection of new essays focuses on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons in practical agency, making it of interest to scholars and students of philosophy of action, legal philosophy, cognitive psychology, law, social science, and ethics.This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.Introduction George Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco; Part I. The Normative Meaning of Actions: 1. Intentions, permissibility, and the reasons for which we act Ulrike Heuer; 2. Acting and satisficing Sergio Tenenbaum; 3. Interpretation without intentions Heidi M. Hurd; 4. Metasemantics and legal interpretation Ori Simchen; Part II. Normativity of Legal Authority: 5. Doing another's bidding Matthew Hanser; 6. Legal authority and the paradox of intention in action Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco; 7. The deliberative al“,