This book explores the dispositional and categorical debates on the metaphysics of properties. It defends the view that all fundamental properties and relations are contingently categorical, while also examining alternative accounts of the nature of properties. Drawing upon both established research and the authors own investigation into the broader discipline of the metaphysics of science, this book provides a comprehensive study of the many views and opinions regarding a most debatable topic in contemporary metaphysics. Science in Metaphysics will be of interest to metaphysicians of science, analytic metaphysicians and philosophers of science and physics alike.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5
Against Dispositional Monism.............................................................................................. 11
1.1 Preliminaries: Two Distinct Issues ....................................................................................11
1.2 The Truthmaking Criterion for the Dispositional/Categorical Distinction ...................12
1.3 Arguing Against Dispositional Monism From the Actual Existence of Fundamental
Categorical Features ........................................................................................................................17
1.3.1 Spatiotemporal Relations as fundamental categorical features .............................18
1.3.1.1 Introduction............................................................................................................18
1.3.1.2 Spatiotemporal Relations and Subjunctive Conditionals in pre-GR theories ..21
1.3.1.3 Birds Argument for the Dispositional Essence of Spatiotemporal Relations ..22