This book compares John Searle and Michel Foucault's radically opposed views on truth.This book compares John Searle and Michel Foucault's radically opposed views on truth in order to demonstrate the need for invigorating cross-fertilization between the analytic and Continental philosophical traditions. By pressing beyond familiar clichés about analytic philosophy and postmodernism, a surprising convergence of Searle and Foucault's thought on truth emerge. Prado rebuts the analytic impression of Michel Foucault as a radical relativist and shows that Foucault not only is a realist, but also is much closer than many imagine to John Searle and Donald Davidson, both model analytic thinkersThis book compares John Searle and Michel Foucault's radically opposed views on truth in order to demonstrate the need for invigorating cross-fertilization between the analytic and Continental philosophical traditions. By pressing beyond familiar clichés about analytic philosophy and postmodernism, a surprising convergence of Searle and Foucault's thought on truth emerge. Prado rebuts the analytic impression of Michel Foucault as a radical relativist and shows that Foucault not only is a realist, but also is much closer than many imagine to John Searle and Donald Davidson, both model analytic thinkersThe analytic impression of Michel Foucault is of a radical relativist whose views on truth entail linguistic idealism. C.G. Prado's book lays this misperception to rest, showing analytic philosophers that Foucault's ideas about truth are defensible and merit serious attention, while also demonstrating to Continental philosophers that Searle's ideas about truth can not be ignored. Prado rebuts the analytic impression of Michel Foucault as a radical relativist whose views on truth entail denial of the objective world, and demonstrates that Foucault is not only a realist, but also much closer than many imagine to John Searle and Donald Davidson, both model analytic thinkerslós