This book aims to show how game theory can be radically reformulated so as to make it applicable to the study of strategic conflict in a number of fields.Though based on the classical theory of games, this text proposes major changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory, by postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but to the consequences of countermoves as well.Though based on the classical theory of games, this text proposes major changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory, by postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but to the consequences of countermoves as well.Steven J. Brams' Theory of Moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes major changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, it extends the strategic analysis of conflicts into the more distant future. Applied to a series of cases drawn from politics, economics, sociology, fiction, and the Bible, the theory provides not only an explanation of their outcomes but also shows why they unfolded as they did.1. Rules of play: the starting point matters; 2. The anticipation problem: there may be no resolution; 3. Magnanimity: it sometimes pays; 4. Moving power: breaking the cycle; 5. Order and threat power: eliminating indeterminacy and communicating intentions; 6. Information in games: misperceptions, deception, and omniscience; 7. Incomplete information in larger games: a model of negotiations; 8. Summary and conclusions. While this book is firmly in the tradition of game theory, no other yet presents these arguments. It is sure to be widely read at all levels of academia. Choice ...a useful book that illustrates the similarities among a wide variety of political l;