Trust and Fear in Civil Wars Ending Intrastate Conflicts [Paperback]

This book uses a new theoretical framework to explain when civil wars become protracted. It focuses on how individuals evaluate their prospects under a peace settlement and shows how fears of future security can make war seem like the safest option, providing new insights on how intergroup interactions and reputation influence civil war processes.Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.Chapter One: IntroductionChapter Two: Trust and Fears for the FutureChapter Three: Trust and Fear across Civil WarsChapter Four: Sri Lanka: Both Short And Long Civil WarsChapter Five: Turkey: Ongoing Conflict With No SettlementChapter Six: Cyprus: Frozen Conflict with No SettlementChapter Seven: ConclusionsShanna Kirschner is assistant professor of political science at Allegheny College.