Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information [Paperback]

Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or OThink of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O1. Introduction.- I: The Game Theoretic Analysis.- 2. Two-Person Bargaining with Incomplete Information.- 2.1 The Two-Person Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.- 2.2 Two-Person Bargaining Models with Incomplete Information.- 3. The Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies.- 3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions.- 3.2 The Case of No Discounting.- 3.3 The Expected Equilibrium Payoffs.- II: The Game Playing Experiment.- 4. Related Bargaining Experiments.- 4.1 Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information.- 4.2 Fairness in Bargaining.- 5. The Experimental Design.- 5.1 Technical Conditions.- 5.2 The Experimental Design.- 5.3 Notes on the Evaluation of the Experiment.- 6. The Agreement Outcomes.- 6.1 Hypotheses on tlÓ6