Well-Being and Theism is divided into two distinctive parts. The first part argues that desire-fulfillment welfare theories fail to capture the 'good' part of 'good for', and that objective list welfare theories fail to capture the 'for' part of 'good for'. Then, with the aim of capturing both of these parts of 'good for', a conjunctive theory-one which places both a value constraint and a desire constraint on well-being-is advanced. Lauinger then defends this proposition, which he calls the desire-perfectionism theory, against possible objections.? ?
In the second part, Lauinger explores the question What metaphysics best supports the claim that the vast majority of humans have the desires for friendship, accomplishment, health, etc., built into themselves? It is argued that there are two general metaphysical routes that might convincingly be taken here, and that each one leads us toward theism.
Examines how theories of well-being relate to ethics as well as to theism.?
William A. Lauingeris Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Chestnut Hill College, PA, USA.
IntroductionPart One: The No Priority TheoryChapter One: General Remarks on Theories of Well-Being Chapter Two: Desire-fulfillment TheoriesChapter Three: Objective List Theories Chapter Four: The No Priority Theory Chapter Five: Hybrid Theories in General Part Two: What Metaphysics Best Supports the Proposed Account of Well-Being?Chapter Six: An Evolutionary Grounding for the No Priority TheoryChapter Seven: An Aristotelian Grounding for the No Priority TheoryChapter Eight: On Desires as Infinite in CharacterConclusionBibliography