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The World Without, the Mind Within An Essay on First-Person Authority [Hardcover]

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  • Category: Books (Philosophy)
  • Author:  Gallois, Andr}}
  • Author:  Gallois, Andr}}
  • ISBN-10:  0521560934
  • ISBN-10:  0521560934
  • ISBN-13:  9780521560931
  • ISBN-13:  9780521560931
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Publisher:  Cambridge University Press
  • Pages:  228
  • Pages:  228
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Binding:  Hardcover
  • Pub Date:  01-May-1996
  • Pub Date:  01-May-1996
  • SKU:  0521560934-11-MPOD
  • SKU:  0521560934-11-MPOD
  • Item ID: 100924475
  • Seller: ShopSpell
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  • Delivery by: Jul 01 to Jul 03
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A challenging study of the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states.In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.In this original and challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a new thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the center of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold.Preface; Introduction; Part I. First-Person Authority: 1. The problem; 2. Scepticism about first-person authority; Part II. The Basic and Extended Accounts: 3. A preliminary account; 4. Defending the basic account; 5. ExtendinglÓË
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